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TOURO LAW REVIEW
pamphleteering [but rather] regulates pamphlet distribution in
private ... places."26
Therefore, under both the Federal and State constitutions, the
constitutional right of free speech does not guarantee the right to
continue to throw a newspaper onto the property of a homeowner
who has requested that such unwanted deliveries be discontinued.
The Federal and the New York State Constitutions are in
agreement with this free speech interpretation.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
Time Square Books, Inc.,
V.
City of Rochester 27
(decided July 12, 1996)
The plaintiff, Time Square Books, sought to enjoin the
defendant, City of Rochester, from enforcing a newly passed
ordinance 28 which mandated that booths used for private viewing
of adult entertainment be constructed and maintained in such a
manner that the interior of the booths be entirely visible to
persons in adjacent public areas.29 The plaintiff claimed that the
showing of such material is protected by both the Federal 3 0 and
New York State Constitutions. 3 1 The plaintiff also asserted that
26. Id. at 158, 38 N.E.2d at 479.
27. 223 A.D.2d 270, 645 N.Y.S.2d 951 (4th Dep't 1996).
28. Rochester, N.Y., Municipal Code § 29-15 (1995).
29. Rochester, N.Y., Municipal Code § 29-15 [1] [2] (1995). This section
states in pertinent part: "Visibility into such booths shall not be blocked or
obscured by doors, curtains, partitions, drapes or any other obstruction
whatsoever." Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...
or of the press . . . ." Id.
31. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Granting a more expansive right than that
afforded by the Federal Constitution, the article states: "Every citizen may
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restrictions of the sort employed by the ordinance violate the free
speech guarantees of both Constitutions. 32 The Supreme Court,
Monroe County, denied plaintiff's motion for a temporary
injunction during the pendency of the action.33 The Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, reversed, 34 holding that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated a likelihood of success on
their constitutional claims, that they would suffer irreparable
injury, and that a balancing of equities weighed in their favor. 35
Concerned with the spread of sexually transmitted diseases,
such as AIDS, the Rochester City Council amended its Municipal
Code to ensure that private booths used for viewing adult
entertainment were not conducive to the types of behavior which
increased the risk of such diseases. 36
The Council found that the presence of doors and other sight
obstructions on these booths facilitated the concealment of such
activity. 37 In order to discourage such behavior, the Council
promulgated regulations which required the owners and operators
of premises which offered such booths to ensure that the booths
were constructed and maintained in such a manner that the entire
interior of the booths remained visible to the adjacent public
area. 38 Additionally, the walls and windows of the booths were
to be of solid construction, without openings, with the walls
extending from the floor to a height of at least six feet. 3 9
Furthermore, the occupancy of the booths was to be limited to
only one person at a time.40
The plaintiff, Time Square Books, operates retail stores which,
in addition to selling sexually explicit books and videotapes,
freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or the press." Id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. CONST. art. I § 8.
33. Tne Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 270, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
34. Id. at 279, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
35. Id. at 278, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 958
36. Id. at 272, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 271, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
40. Id. at 271-72, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
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offers enclosed booths for viewing adult motion pictures. 4 1 In
challenging the open booth requirement of the amended
Rochester Municipal Code, 42 the plaintiff brought an action to
permanently enjoin the enforcement of that portion of the new
provision, which they claim violates the free speech guarantees of
the Federal and State Constitutions. 43  The Supreme Court,
Monroe County, denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction44 during the pendency of the action on this issue. 45
The court's analysis began with the premise that the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution46 protects such forms of
expression as the display of sexually explicit entertainment in
private booths, such as those on plaintiffs premises. 47 Protection
of this form of entertainment is also afforded by Article I,
section 8,48 of the New York State Constitution. 49  The
Rochester ordinance offends the guarantees of both Constitutions
in its attempt to regulate presentation of the protected
expression. 50
In determining the scope of constitutionally guaranteed rights,
"the Federal Constitution fix[es] only the minimum standards
applicable throughout the Nation, and the State[s]
41. Id. at 272, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
42. Plaintiffs did not challenge the solid wall requirement nor the one
person occupancy requirement of the ordinance. Id.
43. Id.
44. "To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs were required to
demonstrate (1) the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits: (2) irreparable
injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted; and (3) a balancing of the
equities in their favor." Id.
45. "The court determined that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits of their constitutional challenges to the ordinances. From
that determination, the conclusion followed that plaintiffs also failed to
demonstrate irreparable injury or a balancing of equities in their favor." Id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47. Time Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 273, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 954. See
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that "[niude
dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment").
48. N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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supplement those standards to meet local needs or
expectations. '" 5 1 Freedom of expression is one of the areas in
which New York, through its Constitution, has chosen to expand
upon the minimal guarantees of the Federal Constitution.52
Those standards employed in federal cases involving a
determination of First Amendment rights are informative, but not
dispositive, in cases involving a determination of the same rights
decided under Article 1, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution.
53
The plaintiff raised the issue of the degree to which the
ordinance limits protected speech. 54 A distinction is drawn
between "content-based regulations," which directly aim to affect
the protected activity, and "content-neutral regulations," which
only incidentally affect those protected activities. 55 As a form of
51. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249, 567 N.E.2d
1270, 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 913 (1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954
(1991).
52. People ax rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553. 557, 503
N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986).
53. Id. at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 494-95, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. In Arcara,
the district attorney sought to enjoin a bookstore from permitting illicit sexual
contact on its premises and to obtain an order of abatement to close the
premises for one year. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d
324, 326, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 1091, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1985). rev'd, 478
U.S. 697(1986), revd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492,
510 N.Y.S.2d. 844 (1986). The court of appeals ruled that the closure
constituted an impermissible prior restraint of the First Amendment rights of
Cloud Books, on the grounds that termination of the illicit sexual contact could
be accomplished in a manner which did not impinge upon the sale of books.
Id. at 337, 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the closure statute, N.Y. Public Health
Law § 2321, was directed at non-expressive activity and therefore not violative
of First Amendment rights. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478
U.S. 697, 708 (1986). On remand, the court of appeals held that although it
was bound to accept the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2321 as not being
violative of the First Amendment, under state constitutional law the statute
fails for being broader than necessary to achieve its purpose. Arcara, 68
N.Y.2d at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
54. Time Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 273, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
55. Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 556, 540 N.E.2d 215, 221,
542 N.Y.S.2d 139, 145 (1989). The Town of Islip, petitioner, limited the
1997]
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content-based regulation, 56  aimed specifically at "adult
entertainment," plaintiff argued that the ordinance was
presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. 57 The court
declined to rule on this issue, however, deciding instead that
under the lower standards employed for content-neutral
regulation, 5 8 the plaintiff was entitled to relief. 59
operation of adult entertainment businesses by zoning ordinance to certain
industrial areas. Id. at 549, 540 N.E.2d at 216, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
Respondent Caviglia operated the Happy Hour Bookstore in a downtown area
outside any of the appropriately zoned industrial areas. Id. at 550, 540 N.E.2d
at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141. The Town sought to enjoin the bookstore's non-
conforming use, which Caviglia opposed on the grounds that an injunction
violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 550, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 141. The New York State Court of Appeals found that the intent
of the zoning ordinance, based on a study of the detrimental effects of adult
businesses on their surrounding neighborhoods, was not to restrict free speech,
but rather to prevent the deterioration of downtown business areas. Id. at 553,
540 N.E.2d at 219, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The court of appeals explained
that" [g]overnment action may restrict speech either intentionally or
incidentally. Intentional restrictions are directed at the message conveyed,
either its content or the time, place and manner in which it is disseminated."
Id. at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d. at 145. The court further
explained that "[c]ontent-neutral regulations . . . relate only to the time, place
and manner of expression," Id. at 556-57, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d.
at 145, and "have a purpose other than suppressing protected speech, but
which have incidental effects on speech." Arcara, 65 N.Y.2d at 336, 480
N.E.2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
56. "Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is
a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest." Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
57. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d. at
145.
58. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien burned his draft card
in an antiwar protest. Id. at 369. He fought his conviction for destruction of
the certificate on the grounds that the controlling statute, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462
(b)(1)-(6) (1965), violated his First Amendment freedom of expression rights.
Id. at 376. The Court found that the government had a substantial interest in
preventing the destruction of draft registration certificates. Id. at 380. The
statute was aimed at the non-communicative aspects of draft card destruction,
not at suppressing the expressive element. Id. at 382. As such, it burdens
speech only incidentally. Id. at 376. The Supreme Court stated:
5
et al.: Freedom of Speech
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Accordingly, the rules announced in U.S. v. O'Brien,60 and
similar rules adopted in New York, 61 provide that the State must
show that regulations which "incidentally burden free expression"
are "no broader than necessary" to carry out a legitimate
governmental objective. 62 Interpretation of the "no broader than
necessary" mandate has developed under federal and state
constitutional law to include an examination of the means
employed to restrict free expression. 63 Where alternate avenues
exist to accomplish the aims of the governmental intrusion,
without also impinging on free expression, courts have struck
down overbroad regulations as being unconstitutional. 64
Conversely, demonstration that less restrictive measures have
been unsuccessful in achieving the desired effect, suggests to the
court that stronger remedies are appropriate. 65
[An] incidental limitation[ ] on First Amendment freedoms . . . is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id. at 376-77.
59. Time Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 275, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
60. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
61. Tne Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 275-76, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 956. See
Matter of Nicholson v. State Comm. on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 409
N.E.2d 818, 431 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1980).
62. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d. at 847
(citing Matter of Nicholson, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 409 N.E.2d 818, 431 N.Y.S.2d
340 (1980)).
63. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). The Barnes
court found the statutory prohibition against totally nude dancing to be the
"bare minimum" necessary to achieve the State's interest in protecting order
and morality. Id. at 572. In Arcara, the burden of proving that closure was the
"least restrictive means" of maintaining public health was placed on the State.
Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.




Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 26
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/26
TOURO LAW REVIEW
First Amendment challenges to open booth requirements have
been uniformly unsuccessful throughout the nation. 66  A
consideration of the rights of expression arising under the Federal
Constitution was therefore excluded, simplifying the court's
task. 67 The New York State Constitution, however, provided a
more hospitable environment for those seeking its free expression
protection.68
The Fourth Department noted that, in Arcara, the district
attorney sought closure of the bookstore after an investigation
uncovered that the owner was aware of incidents of illicit sexual
conduct on the premises. 69  Nevertheless, no patrons of the
establishment were arrested nor was an injunction of the illegal
acts sought. 70 The court of appeals found that, under New York
law, the state had failed to prove that the closure was the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the intended purpose. 7
1
Similarly, in the instant case, the City of Rochester failed to
show that the open booth requirement is no broader than
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the ordinance. 72
Defendants failed to offer proof that limiting the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases could not be accomplished in a less
cumbersome manner than infringing on the free expression rights
of the plaintiff.73 Significantly, the court found that enforcement
66. Time Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 273, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 954 (citing a
large number of cases, decided under the Federal Constitution, which
unsuccessfully challenged statutes similar to the Rochester ordinance).
67. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 68 N.Y.2d. 553, 503 N.E.2d at 492, 510
N.Y.S.2d at 844 (The court of appeals decided the case on First Amendment
grounds, was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, and then re-
decided on State Constitutional grounds).
68. Time Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 274, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
69. Id. at 276, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 956. The undercover investigator
personally observed incidents of masturbation and fellatio and was solicited by
a prostitute himself. Arcara, 65 N.Y.2d at 326, 480 N.E.2d at 1091-92, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 846.
70. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 493-94, 510 N.Y.S.2d at
846.
71. Id. at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
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of the unchallenged portions of the amended Rochester
ordinance, in particular those portions dealing with solid wall
construction and the one person per booth requirement, provides
a less intrusive means of facilitating that objective.74
Additionally, the City made no other effort to ensure that the
booths would not be used in the manner sought to be proscribed
by the ordinance. 75
The court distinguished the instant case from both Arcara and
Caviglia on the basis of its facts. 76 The action in Arcara was
premised on the eyewitness testimony of an undercover agent that
illegal activity was occurring on the bookstore premises. 77
Caviglia was based on studies that the Town of Islip had
prepared detailing the harmful secondary effects of "adult
entertainment businesses" on the immediate neighborhood and the
mitigation of those effects through the town's zoning power. 78
In contrast, no illicit sexual activity had been observed in the
plaintiff's establishments, nor was the plaintiff shown to be aware
that high-risk sexual activity was occurring on the premises. 79
In conclusion, the court noted that in addition to a
demonstration of likely success on the merits, the plaintiff also
satisfied the remaining related requirements for a grant of
preliminary injunction. 80  Infringement of the right of free
expression, by itself, constitutes irreparable injury. 81
Additionally, the costs associated with conforming to the new
structural requirements while the action proceeds satisfies
plaintiff's burden of proving that a balancing of equities weighs
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 277, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
77. Arcara, 65 N.Y.2d at 326, 480 N.E.2d at 1091, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
("[Tihe officer specified various lewd and illegal acts he had witnessed ...
including four acts of masturbation and one act of fellatio, and was himself
solicited for sexual conduct for a fee by persons on the premises on several
occasions."). Id.
78. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 549, 540 N.E.2d at 214, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 142-
43.
79. Time Square Books, 223 A.D.2d at 277, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
80. Id. at 278, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
81. Id., 645 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
1997] 839
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 26
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/26
TOURO LAW REVIEW
in their favor. 82 Without a sufficient showing by the city that the
ordinance was necessary to achieve a reduction in the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, the court reversed the order below
and granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
83
The creators of the Federal Constitution envisioned that the
citizens of this country would be guaranteed certain minimum
liberty protections under the Federal Constitution which the states
would be free to expand upon via their individual state
constitutions. New York exercised this option and has,
historically, chosen to extend greater protection in the area of
free speech and expression than the federal government. While
the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to
require only that incidental burdens to free expression be
"narrowly tailored,"' 84 the New York State Court of Appeals has
interpreted Article 1, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution as requiring that "the least restrictive means"
possible be employed to burden its citizens.85 Thus, the disparity
of results reached by a challenge brought under the Federal and
State Constitutions can be understood not only as a contrast in the
liberty interest provided by each, but also as a difference in the
measuring standard utilized by the court.
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
Stringfellow's of New York Ltd. v. City of New York 86
(decided October 24, 1996)
Plaintiff Stringfellow's, along with plaintiffs in two similar
actions, sought to declare as invalid a zoning resolution which, if
82. Id.
83. Id. at 279, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
84. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
85. See Matter of Nicholson, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 409 N.E.2d 818, 431
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1980).
86. 653 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1996).
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